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Abstract 
 
 This paper analyzes the effect of a wage floor on unemployment. Using a model with 
covered and noncovered sectors, comparative static analysis is performed with respect to the size 
of the wage floor, the elasticity of demand for labor in the covered sector, and the elasticity of 
the wage in the noncovered sector with respect to the size of the noncovered sector labor force. It 
turns out, contrary to the existing literature, that for none of these parameters is the comparative 
static effect unidirectional. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 This paper examines the economic effects of wage floors. By definition, a wage floor is 
the lowest wage that any employer may pay or that any worker may receive. The wage floor may 
be caused by a minimum wage set by the government, public policy facilitating unions’ engaging 
in collective bargaining aimed at raising the wages of their members, or some other public 
intervention.1 I shall by the forces of supply and demand. 
 In the balance of this paper, I examine one consequence of wage floors, namely, the 
unemployment effect. I ask, when will the amount of unemployment resulting from a wage floor 
be large and when small? 
 I work with a two-sector model consisting of a covered and a noncovered sector.2 The 
two-sector model is a stylized representation of differential applicability of minimum wages or 
compliance with them, larger union wage effects in some sectors of the economy than in others, 
etc. Comparative statics are performed with respect to three parameters of interest: 
• the size of the wage floor; 
• the elasticity of demand for labor in the covered sector; 
• the elasticity of the wage in the noncovered sector with respect to the size of the 
noncovered sector labor force. 
 It turns out, contrary to the existing literature, that for none of these parameters is the 
comparative static effect unidirectional. 
                                                          
1 It may also be caused by efficiency wages, but that is a whole other story. 
2 This framework was developed by Harris and Todaro (1970) and Harberger (1971) in the context of rural-urban 
migration in developing countries. It was used subsequently by Mincer (1976, 1984) and Grämlich (1976) to analyze 
the economics of minimum wages in an economy with covered and noncovered sectors and extended by Fields 
(1975, 1989) to analyze the determinants of unemployment. For a more intuitive discussion of these models without 
the proofs, see Fields (1994). 
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2. The model 
 
 The model used here features wage dualism and open unemployment. Expected wage 
maximization is the central behavioral postulate on the supply side of the labor market.3 Workers 
are assumed to be risk-neutral and to decide between supplying their labor to one sector or the 
other on the basis of the expected value of the wages to be earned in each, taking account of 
possible unemployment. Any temporary differential between expected wages in the two sectors 
will be eroded as migration brings expected wages into balance. Thus, expected wages, not 
nominal wages, are equalized across sectors in equilibrium: 
𝐸(𝑊𝐶) = 𝐸(𝑊𝑁). 
Firms’ demand for labor curves are assumed to be inverse functions of the wage in the sector in 
question. Following the established literature, labor demand in one sector is assumed to be 
independent of wages in the other sector. 
 Before the imposition of a wage floor, competition in the labor market is assumed to 
equalize wages in the two sectors at a level denoted by 𝑊𝑂. 𝐸𝐶
𝑂 workers are assumed to be 
employed in the covered sector and the remaining 𝐿 − 𝐸𝐶
𝑂 members of the labor force to be 
employed in the noncovered sector. 
 Suppose now that a wage floor is imposed on some sectors of the economy but not 
others. In the covered sector, the wage is raised by 𝛾%: 
𝑊𝐶 = 𝑊𝑂(1 + 𝛾) 
                                                          
3 For ease of presentation, the model is a single-period one, hence uses expected wages instead of expected present 
values. The multi-period model found in Fields (1975), Mincer (1976), and Gramlich (1976) is more complicated 
than is needed for present purposes. 
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where 𝛾 = (𝑊𝐶 −𝑊𝑂) 𝑊𝑂⁄ . This lowers employment in the covered sector by 𝜂𝛾 percent, where 
𝜂 is the (arc) wage elasticity of demand for labor in the covered sector evaluated between 𝑊𝑂 
and 𝑊𝐶: 
𝐸𝐶 = 𝐸𝐶
𝑂(1 + 𝜂𝛾) 
The reduction in employment in the covered sector and the higher wage there will affect the 
expected wage in that sector. Workers will reallocate themselves such that the expected wages in 
the two sectors are again equalized. 
 Express the probability of employment in the covered sector as the ratio of covered sector 
employment (𝐸𝐶) to covered sector labor force (𝐿𝐶) including both employed and unemployed; 
this is a special case of a formulation initiated by Todaro (1969) and used subsequently by 
Mincer (1976) and Grämlich (1976). Thus 
𝐸(𝑊𝐶) = 𝑊𝐶(𝐸𝐶 𝐿𝐶⁄ ) 
The equilibrium condition (1) becomes 
𝑊𝐶(𝐸𝐶 𝐿𝐶⁄ ) = 𝑊𝑁 
The wage in the noncovered sector, 𝑊𝑁, adjusts to clear the market, so that the supply of 
noncovered sector workers and the number demanded in that sector are equal. The total labor 
force is the sum of the covered and noncovered sector labor forces: 
𝐿𝐶 + 𝐿𝑁 = 𝐿 
Unemployment (U) is defined as 
𝑈 = 𝐿𝐶 − 𝐸𝐶  
 It remains now to close the model by specifying 𝑊𝑁. Because our purpose is to show that 
comparative static results are ambiguous, it suffices to present conditions consistent with the 
general model under which opposite effects obtain. This can be done using two special cases. 
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 Model I makes a special simplifying assumption: that the wage in the noncovered sector 
is invariant with respect to the size of that sector’s labor force. This simplifying assumption has 
been made by a number of authors who have extended the Harris-Todaro model including Fields 
(1975), Anand and Joshi (1979), Heady (1981), Stiglitz (1982), Sah and Stiglitz (1985), and Bell 
(1991), among others. 
Thus, Model I is closed by assuming that the wage in the noncovered sector is constant and given 
by 
𝑊𝑁(𝐿𝑁) = 𝑊𝑁
𝑂 = 𝑊𝑂 
 Model II makes a different simplifying assumption: that total wages in the noncovered 
sector do not change with the size of that sector’s labor force. This could arise under two 
circumstances. One is in a classic labor surplus situation of the type modeled by Lewis (1954) 
and Fei and Ranis (1964), wherein labor in the noncovered sector has zero marginal product, and 
instead is paid its average product. 
𝑊𝑁 = 𝑄 𝐿𝑁⁄  
Alternatively, suppose labor is not in surplus and the production function is given by 𝑄𝑁 =
Φ(𝐾𝑁) ln 𝐿𝑁. If 𝐾𝑁 and 𝑃𝑁, the price of the product, are fixed over the relevant range, then the 
value of the marginal product of labor in the noncovered sector equals 𝑃𝑁Φ(𝐾𝑁)/𝐿𝑁. Denoting 
𝑃𝑁Φ(𝐾𝑁) by 𝑄 and equating the value of marginal product to the wage, we obtain 
𝑊𝑁 = 𝑄/𝐿𝑁 
which is of the same form as Eq. (9) but derived under alternative circumstances. 
 Model I thus consists of Eqs. (l)-(7) and Eq. (8), Model II of Eqs. (l)-(7) and Eq. (9). We 
turn now to the comparative static results in these two models. 
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3. Unemployment in the two-sector model: Comparative static results 
 
3.1. Ambiguous effect of the size of the wage floor (𝛾) 
 
 To see the ambiguity, consider Model I. The unemployment rate can be solved for 
explicitly in this model as 
𝑈𝐼 = 𝛾𝐸𝐶
𝑂(1 + 𝜂𝛾) 
A higher wage floor means higher 𝛾. This lowers unemployment if and only if 𝜂 < −
1
2
𝛾. Thus, 
although a higher wage floor may result in more unemployment, an extremely elastic demand for 
labor in the covered sector produces the surprising result that a higher wage floor may result in 
less unemployment. 
 
3.2. Ambiguous effect of the elasticity of demand for labor in the covered sector (𝜂) 
 
 Write unemployment in Model I explicitly as 
𝑈𝐼 = ((𝑊𝐶/𝑊𝑂) − 1)𝐸𝐶
𝐼 = 𝛾𝐸𝐶
𝑂(1 + 𝜂𝛾) 
where 𝐸𝐶
𝑂 and 𝐸𝐶
𝐼  are, respectively, initial and final employment in the covered sector, 𝛾 is the 
wage increment due to the wage floor, and 𝜂 is the elasticity of demand for labor in the covered 
sector. Eq. (11) shows that given 𝛾 and 𝐸𝐶
𝑂, the more negative is 𝜂 in this model, the less 
unemployment there will be. 
 The opposite possibility—that a more elastic demand for labor might result in more 
unemployment—may be demonstrated using Model II, in which 𝑊𝑁 = 𝑄/𝐿𝑁. Denote the results 
for the less elastic demand curve by prime superscripts and the results for the more elastic 
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demand by double-primes; 𝑊𝐶
𝑂 denotes the common covered sector wage floor. For the less 
elastic demand, the equilibrium condition (5) becomes 
𝑊𝐶
𝑂(𝐸𝐶
′ /𝐿𝐶
′ ) = 𝑄/𝐿𝑁
′ ⇔ 𝐿𝐶
′ /𝐿𝑁
′ = 𝐾′,     where     𝐾′ = 𝑊𝐶
𝑂𝐸𝐶
′ /𝑄 
Substitution of Eq. (12) into the definition of unemployment yields 
𝑈′ = 𝐿𝐶
′ − 𝐸𝐶
′ = (𝐾′/(1 + 𝐾′))𝐿 − 𝐸𝐶
′  
By analogy, 
𝑈" = 𝐿𝐶
" − 𝐸𝐶
" = (𝐾"/(1 + 𝐾")) 𝐿 − 𝐸𝐶
"      where     𝐾′ = 𝑊𝐶
𝑂𝐸𝐶
"/𝑄 
The difference between the two unemployment amounts is 
 
 
 
 
 
The term (𝐸𝐶
′ − 𝐸𝐶
" ) is positive, because the prime term corresponds to the less elastic labor 
demand curve, for which employment is greater. Suppose that for certain parameter values, the 
ratio of the two terms in square brackets in Eq. (13) is less than one. Then the term in curly 
braces will be negative. In this event, 𝑈" > 𝑈′, i.e., unemployment is greater for the more elastic 
labor demand curve. 
The requisite parameter values can be found by establishing conditions under which the 
denominator in square brackets exceeds the numerator. A sufficient condition for this to hold is 
simply that 𝐸𝐶
′ + 𝐸𝐶
" > 𝐿. 
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3.3. Ambiguity of the elasticity of the wage in the noncovered sector with respect to the size of 
that sector's labor force (∈) 
 
Eqs. (l)-(7) may be combined to yield 
𝑊𝑂𝐸𝐶
𝑂(1 + 𝛾 + 𝜂𝛾 + 𝜂𝛾2) = 𝑊𝑁𝐿𝐶 
If the term in parentheses is greater than 1, then 𝑊𝑁𝐿𝐶 must increase as a result of the wage 
floor. This requires that labor move into the covered sector, by the following reasoning. Suppose 
𝐿𝐶 increases and hence 𝐿𝑁 falls. When 𝐿𝑁 falls, 𝑊𝑁 rises. Therefore, 𝑊𝑁𝐿𝐶 rises when labor 
moves into the covered sector. Likewise, if the term in parentheses is less than one, labor must be 
moving out of the covered sector. For a given wage floor, the term in parentheses will be greater 
than one if 𝜂 > −1/(1 + 𝛾) and negative otherwise. That is, any sufficiently elastic demand for 
labor in the covered sector (where sufficiently elastic means elasticity 𝜂 > −1/(1 + 𝛾) implies 
that labor moves out of the covered sector, else labor moves in. 
 The ambiguity of the effects of the elasticity of the wage in the noncovered sector with 
respect to the size of that sector’s labor force may be demonstrated by comparing Models I and 
II. Model I has constant per capita wage in the noncovered sector and Model II constant total 
wage bill in the noncovered sector. For given covered sector wage 𝑊𝐶
𝑂 and covered sector 
employment 𝐸𝐶
𝑂, the amounts of unemployment are given by 
𝑈𝐼 = ((𝑊𝐶
𝑂/𝑊𝑂) − 1)𝐸𝐶
𝑂 
in Model I and 
𝑈𝐼𝐼 = 𝐿𝐶
𝐼𝐼 − 𝐸𝐶
𝑂 = ((𝐿𝐶
𝐼𝐼/𝐸𝐶
𝑂) − 1)𝐸𝐶
𝑂 = ((𝑊𝐶
𝑂/𝑊𝑁
𝐼𝐼) − 1) 
𝐸𝐶
𝑂 = ((𝑊𝐶
𝑂/(𝑄/𝐿𝑁
𝐼𝐼)) − 1)𝐸𝐶
𝑂 
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in Model II. From Eqs. (15) and (16), it is seen that 𝑈𝐼 >=< 𝑈𝐼𝐼 as 𝑊𝐶
𝑂 <=> 𝑊𝑁
𝐼𝐼, i.e., if in 
Model II, the wage in the noncovered sector is greater/same/lower than initially. And since, in 
Model II, the noncovered sector wage is greater/same/lower than initially as the noncovered 
sector labor force is smaller/same/greater than initially, and since the noncovered sector labor 
force is smaller/same/greater than initially as the demand for labor in the covered sector is 
sufficiently inelastic/knife-edge/sufficiently elastic, it follows that 𝑈𝐼 >=< 𝑈𝐼𝐼 as the demand 
for labor in the covered sector is sufficiently inelastic/knife- edge/sufficiently elastic. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 The reader should remember that the model used in this paper is a special case of the 
two-sector models of Mincer (1976) and Gramlich (1976). When ambiguous results are found in 
a special case of a model, the more general model is necessarily ambiguous as well. The 
ambiguity of these comparative static results has not been demonstrated previously. 
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